UNITED STATES POLICY OF PREEMPTION AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1999-2014
The infamous attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, by Osama Bin Laden Led Al Qaeda network marked a turning point in the relationship between the United States and the Middle East Islamic world. This watershed event led to the United States policy of preemption and the subsequent U.S invasion of Afghanistan(where Al Qaeda organization was harboured by Taliban regime) and the subsequent unjustifiable invasion of Iraq. The argument that the united state policy of preemption would ensure security in Middle East and stop subsequent attacks on America and its allies necessitated this study. Therefore, the study examined the nexus between United States policy of preemption and security in the Middle East and noted like in other studies that the United State policy of preemption has not fully stabilized peace in the Middle East. Hence, this study deduced that the invasion of suspected axis of evil in the Middle East aggravated the security situation in the region. Therefore the study argues that though the unilateral uses of force have been able to checkmate large scale attack such as 9/11, it has as well triggered series of attack against American troops and Allies. Hence, the study further argues that the counter terrorism policy of the United States is not in accord with United Nations charter. The study posited that the high level of violence in the Middle East is as a response to the untied state occupation in the region. The study made use of ex-post factor research design, qualitative method of data collection, descriptive method of data analysis and also adopted theory of power politics from the realist perspective. The study noted that the unilateral use of force should be adopted after careful consideration and as a last resort. It recommended among others, the importance of the United States allowing the Middle East region develop and govern its polity with institutions conversant with them and not by enforcing democracy.